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LECTURE: Foucault in Cyberspace+ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I’m going to talk today about the Internet in relation to political theory and, in particular, to 
libertarianism. 
Anyone who has spent time on the Net or who has read the writings of Internet gurus knows that 
the default set of political assumptions on the Internet is a libertarian set of arguments. In fact, if 
you had to come up with a technology-or more expansively, a space-that makes libertarianism 
attractive, it would be the Internet. The Net mirrors some of the more popular libertarian images of 
the good society. The Net was formed through a relatively decentralized and anarchic process. The 
state certainly played a huge role in getting the ball rolling by funding research, setting up precursor 
networks, funding the creation of open standards, and so on. But in spite, or perhaps because, of 
this state involvement, the Internet developed without a single master plan or scheme. Thus, the way 
in which the Internet was formed can be seen as an example of the kind of spontaneous, 
decentralized ordering that is very attractive to libertarian thinking. 
Indeed this decentralized process of development is one of the reasons why the term “information 
superhighway” is so inappropriate. The “information superhighway” conjures up a structured world, 
the kind of Eisenhower world in which the state designs and builds the entire system according to a 
central master plan. This image is a complete contrast to the decentralized character of the Net and, 
for libertarians, the unplanned organic nature of its growth is precisely the key to its success. 
There are other reasons why the Net is implicitly hospitable to the ideas of libertarianism. People 
think of the Internet mainly in relation to speech, and speech is the most essential aspect of 
libertarianism for most people. Even those who are not libertarian in other aspects of their lives will 
see that speech is an area where libertarian ideas have particular bite. 
So much for the reasons why the Net is hospitable to libertarianism. What about the problems with 
libertarian ideas? Stepping back from the Net for a moment, we know that one of libertarianism’s 
major conceptual weaknesses as a political theory is that it cannot provide a coherent definition of 
harm. If one basic tenet of libertarianism is that my freedom should not be impaired until I impose 
harm on someone else, there obviously needs to be some coherent definition of what counts as a 
harm. Otherwise, the principle would be devoid of meaning. 
What concept of harm makes sense then? If we define harm as merely whatever the law says is a 
“harm,” one would be free to do only what the law says you could do. Yet this definition of harm 
would render libertarianism an empty ideal. If the sovereign wants to prohibit you from homosexual 
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love, driving without a seatbelt, or listening to the collected works of Donna Summer, it merely 
defines these as “harms” and then it may regulate you as it wishes. Defining harm through a notion 
of natural rights offers some possibilities, but it also offers even greater problems. 
Without getting into the rich and complex academic literature on this point, it is clear that (1) the 
search for a harm principle is a difficult one but that (2) in the realm of speech and the exchange of 
ideas, the problem of harm becomes much less salient for many people. (Though, to be sure, there 
have been powerful criticisms of this perspective in recent years.) The dominant vision is that no 
harm is imposed by speech. People say, “Sticks and stones will break my bones, but words-or, in this 
case, bytes-will never hurt me.” The Net is not only an attractive place for libertarianism because of 
its structure, it is a place where the conceptual problem with libertarianism-the need to define harm-
is much less obvious. 
There are other reasons that the Net is hospitable to libertarians. In the ideal libertarian world, we 
have to allow for the possibility of easy “exit” so that citizens can leave communities which they find 
oppressive or simply annoying. That is, if you do not like the rules we set up in our community, then 
you can leave and go somewhere else. In one sense, this harkens back to the work of social contract 
theorists such as Locke; Locke tells those who do not like the social contract that they can leave and 
go to the savage wilds of America. In the real world, of course, to “exit” in this way is frequently 
impossible and always costly. On the Net, exit seems like more of a real possibility. If you do not 
like this virtual community, you actually can leave and go to the savage wilds of America Online. In 
other words, you can pick your community and its rules. Instead of overarchingly coercive rules 
posed from above, the rules of a community are set by the community’s own members. 
For all of these reasons, then, the Net seems like a fertile place for libertarian ideas to go-and indeed 
they have, to the point that libertarians feel a real sense of resentment at the notion that meatspace 
governments would dare to attempt to impose their laws on the virtual world. John Perry Barlow, 
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and a consultant in the areas of free speech and 
the Internet, captured this feeling in his Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace: 
Governments of the industrial world, you weary giants of flesh and steel. I come from 
cyberspace, the new home of mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us 
alone. You are not welcome among us; you have no sovereignty where we gather. We have 
no elected government, nor are we likely to have one. So I address you with no greater 
authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we 
are building to be naturally independent to the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have 
no moral right to rule us, nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have reason 
to fear. 1 
So far I have argued that there is a predominantly libertarian slant to political discussion on, and 
about, the Net. This libertarian slant comes, in part, from the notion that states are helpless to 
                                                          
1 John Barlow, A Cyberspace Independence Declaration (visited Apr. 24, 1999). 
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regulate the Net and, in part, from a set of assumptions that the Net is both naturally and 
structurally a hospitable place for libertarian ideals. Today I want to make the unorthodox claim that 
libertarianism on the Net is actually surprisingly blind to the potential exercise of state power. That 
is to say that the central Net libertarian ideas, which I shall call “The Internet Trinity,” are actually 
incorrect because they assume too easily that the Net cannot be regulated. They assume there is no 
way for the state to control the Internet and thus no reason to fear regulation. So, whether we want 
it or not, libertarianism will be the regime, or at least there will be no regulation of any extensive 
kind. From there, the Internet prophets move to arguments about what our community should 
actually be doing. I am going to argue that the underlying assumptions of these beliefs are 
incomplete, and in some cases, just wrong. 
II. THE INTERNET TRINITY-THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHY THE INTERNET 
CANNOT BE REGULATED BY STATES 
A. The Internet Treats Censorship as a Malfunction...and Routes Around It 
Let me begin by laying out the Internet trinity-the three tenets of the Internet faith that tell us why 
the Internet cannot be regulated by states. The first one, from John Gilmore, one of the founders of 
the EFF,2 is that the Internet treats censorship as a malfunction and routes around it. This tenet 
contains a vital technical truth. The Internet is a distributed network. It is a system which has no 
central node, no organizing exchange-no one single radio tower, broadcasting device, or control 
center. Thus it is extremely hard to shut down the Net. You put a blockage in one place, and 
messages flow like water around it. In fact, “packet-switching” is basically a method of 
communication by hitchhiking. That is to say, when you write your e-mails or put together a web 
page, your data is broken up into several different packets, each carrying a little sign that says, 
“Going to New Haven.” The packet of data then hitches a ride along the network. Some of the 
packets will travel by way of New York, some will travel by way of Boston, others will bounce 
around for ages until they finally get to their destinations where they will be integrated seamlessly. 
Try to imagine a censor trying to shut this thing down. It is like trying to grab the soap in the bath-
you grab for it and it slips away. The idea of trying to exercise control over this seems impossible, 
hence the idea that the Internet treats censorship as a malfunction. The packets treat censorship the 
same way that they do a downed server-they just go around it. 
Now this produces what I call the “libertarian Gotcha!” Imagine that you are controlling a large 
society and you want your citizens to have the benefits of the Internet but you don’t want them to 
have access to the entire content of the Net. Well, you face a real problem. If this was a traditional 
form of broadcast media, you may be able to jam the signal, as the Soviet Union did for a long time. 
If this was a print publication, you might embargo undesirable material at the border. In contrast, 
the Net seems like a tap that only has two settings-it is either on or off. Once it is turned on, you get 
access to everything. This offers the censor a Faustian bargain. The censor can either say, “We can 
                                                          
2 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit organization that is dedicated to preserving the rights of 
Internet users. 
The EFF maintains a homepage at http://www.eff.org. 
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give our society, our company, our state, our community access to the Net, but that’s access to all of 
the Net. Or we do not have any access to the Net at all.” To the civil libertarian, this is an 
extraordinarily nice position to have people in. It is a deal you cannot refuse, yet it is a deal you do 
not want to accept. 
Along with this idea often comes a related faith in the history of technology; a kind of technological 
determinism or technological meliorism in which all societies are moving to an ever more distributed 
communication system; away from the control of literacy among the elite and towards multiple 
forms of communications. The Net seems like the ultimate embodiment of this imaginary history. It 
is the dispersed network par excellence. Indeed, if you subscribe to this view, the Internet is literally 
the end of history; the ultimately dispersed communications technology. 
B. Information Wants to Be Free 
The second part of the Internet trinity is Stewart Brand’s great phrase “information wants to be 
free.” This is the idea that the Net is incapable of being regulated not only because of the 
technology, but also because of the nature of the messages, the content, on the Net. Many authors 
believe that information wants to be free-by its nature, information is something which spreads 
freely beyond anyone’s control. The Net is a realm of information, and information is very hard to 
regulate. The state is too slow and too cumbersome to deal with the technology and to rein in the 
information. Information will just squirt out of your fingers every time you try to grab it. 
C. No Single Sovereign Can Regulate Speech 
The third component of the Net trinity is John Perry Barlow’s phrase, “On the Net, the First 
Amendment is a local ordinance.” People appeal to the First Amendment whenever they do not 
want to be restricted, even in cases, such as the regulation of speech by private parties, where, 
technically speaking, it has no application. The Cybernauts have turned First Amendment faith on 
its head. The Net libertarians certainly support the constitutional ideal being invoked, but they think 
we are putting our faith in the wrong place. We should not put our faith in the law to protect free 
speech. We should put our faith in technology. Why? Because on an Internet that is global, it is in 
fact impossible for individual states to regulate speech. 
The nature of the network technology, the nature of the informational content, and the fact that the 
Net stretches across borders beyond the control of any one sovereign all mean that speech cannot 
be regulated. This kind of three-fold argument has even been extended by others. The cyberpunks, 
for example, argue that various advances in cryptography will allow us to communicate with each 
other in unbreakable code. Unbreakable encryption will allow us to set up private digital currencies. 
It will allow us to set up virtual companies, which exist beyond the reach of any state to regulate. It 
will be the ultimate evasion of regulation. We will actually be able to create a virtual economy, the 
currency of which cannot be controlled by any individual state and within which individuals are 
perfectly anonymous and unidentifiable. We will merrily and happily transact with one another in 
cyberspace beyond the reach of the state, which will wither away as its tax revenues disappear. This 
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vision of cyber-anarchy, like the narrower ideas of digital libertarianism, is premised on the belief 
that the state cannot regulate the Internet. 
III. FALLACIES OF THE INTERNET TRINITY-WHY THE STATE CAN REGULATE THE 
INTERNET 
A. The Law Does More Than Punish After the Fact 
The view that the state cannot regulate the Internet is overstated and actually wrong. Though Net 
libertarians might be surprised to hear it, their idea of law is an overwhelmingly positivist one-and 
nineteenth century positivism at that. Under this view, law is a command backed by threats. It 
comes from a sovereign and is directed towards a geographically defined area, in which there are 
subjects who render that sovereign habitual obedience. Law is paradigmatically criminal-it says, “Do 
not do that or else the state will punish you.” 
In actuality, of course, there is a lot more to law than criminal law. There is a lot more to law than 
the punishment of actors ex post facto for having done certain things. The law covers many more 
areas and exercises power in many other ways. The law sets up property and tort systems and enlists 
private actors as “private attorneys general” whose job it is to support schemes of public regulation. 
It does this by making them liable and encouraging them to change their behavior and the behavior 
of others, as with tort liability or emissions trading in pollution control. It does so by offering them 
positive incentives to police other parties, as through contingency fee awards to lawyers or statutory 
damages to whistleblowers. Finally, it does so simply by trying to line up the self-interest of private 
parties in such a way that the everyday operation of the market will bring about the desired end. 
B. The Internet May Also Be Regulated by Technology 
Libertarians tend to look at technology as something that is neutral. If there are problems on the 
Net, they can be solved by the software, by the hardware, or by the code. There will be a technical 
fix for it. Yet libertarians do not seem to be troubled by the idea of a technical fix for regulating 
conduct. To them, regulation through technology is unimportant while regulation by the state seems 
implicitly much more problematic. Later in this talk, I will argue both that libertarians ought to be 
more skeptical about technological solutions and that, through standard setting and “architectural” 
changes, the state has considerably more ability to regulate the Net than had been previously 
imagined. 
C. Both Public and Private Rules Serve to Regulate 
The final assumption underlying the Internet trinity is a vision of markets expanding beyond state 
boundaries and flourishing without law, without regulation. We envision a perfect, free market 
existing without the state exercising power over it. In this vision, markets form spontaneously in the 
absence of regulation. The rules of contract, property, tort, and intellectual property are not seen as 
regulation, but are merely elements constituting the market. We tend to see both private and public 
law-environmental regulation, say-as being regulatory mechanisms for shaping marketplace 
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transactions. But a moment’s thought (and a little legal realism) should reveal what a shallow view 
this is. The state, in fact, exercises enormous power, through its ability to set up the ground rules of 
property, contract, and tort, the very rules that constitute the market. 
IV. FOUCAULT’S VISION OF POWER AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE INTERNET 
So where does Foucault come into all of this? Foucault’s ideas are useful in two ways. In his work, 
Discipline and Punish,3 and a variety of other places, Foucault says that our visions of power are 
much too obsessed with the state. We tend to focus on the state, and in particular, we tend to focus 
on the triangle of the sovereign, the citizen, and the right. Our vision of power is largely this: I, the 
sovereign disciplining you, the subject. In a more liberal version perhaps you are able to interpose 
the shield of “a right” which stops me from doing something negative to you. This is a relatively 
simple vision, one of a world in which power is largely exercised by states on individuals unless 
those individuals can claim legal rights to block out state power. Foucault, although he was not 
writing about the Net or even about this century, argues that actually there are many other ways in 
which power is exercised. 
A. The Panopticon: The Internalization of Power 
The first way in which power can be exercised lies in the concept of the Panopticon. Foucault takes 
the utilitarian idea of a prison constructed around a single observing warden, who with his enormous 
telescope moves from cell to cell and may, at any moment, be observing the behavior of the inmates 
in their cells. The inmates never know when the warden is watching; thus, the inmates must 
conform their behavior to the correct rules at all times. The wonderful idea here is that there may 
not actually be any enforcement mechanism other than self-regulation. That is, the warden may be 
sleeping on the job, yet the inmates will behave because they think the warden is monitoring them. 
Thus, there has been an internalization of power, an internalization of the sovereign as represented 
by the warden. It is a penal version of the super-ego where you have a little voice in your head 
whispering, “The warden might be watching.” 
B. Implicit Regulation Through Architecture 
Foucault also wrote about the way in which architecture actually exercises power. Foucault was 
originally writing about architecture, literally. He directs our attention, not so much to the legal 
status of the worker vis-à-vis the employer, but to the way that the design of the factory itself sets 
the workers up so that each worker is subject to the gaze of all the other workers and to the 
watchful eye of the boss. The workers-like the inmates of the panopticon-are forced to conform 
their behavior to that of an ideal worker. I want to extend this idea to non-literal architectures, and 
in particular, the architecture of the Net. 
The Internet is one type of architecture, an intangible yet obvious structure. Foucault’s vision of 
constructing a space that actually exercises power applies here as well. In this space, if our vision of 
                                                          
3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977). 
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power is the sovereign who punishes bad citizens, then we would say that power has no foothold on 
the Net. But architecture, the ways in which the system is set up to permit, or to require, certain 
forms of identification, monitoring, or payment, is a kind of power that constrains quite effectively. 
Architecture is important because it can construct constructing a world in which individuals interact 
in such a way that each person can only do the things that he or she is supposed to do—alternative 
behaviors are not permitted by the architecture. 
V. A MORE COMPLETE VISION OF THE REGULATION OF THE NET 
Foucault’s point is that focusing on the state provides an incomplete account of power because 
private parties wield power as well. Power is not only exercised by the sovereign. Applying this 
argument to the Net, we can see that the vision of the state regulating the Net by punishing 
wrongdoers ex post is remarkably incomplete. 
Let me start with an example, the Digital Telephony Act. When digital telephones were being 
introduced in the United States, the FBI insisted that the digital telephone system be designed so 
that law enforcement would have the ability to tap digital phones in the same way that they could 
tap landlines. The FBI was worried that digital telephony could be encrypted or used on different 
frequencies to evade law enforcement. The result was that digital telephony is actually designed to be 
tappable. The designed tappability of digital telephony is a completely different vision of regulation 
from the vision of the state punishing you after you have used the digital telephone to commit a 
crime. Here, the state has actually constructed the medium in such a way that the powers of 
discipline and surveillance are included within it. 
This is not unusual for the state to do. As I pointed out before, one of the ways in which the state’s 
power is exercised is by enlisting private parties. Take, for example, the law of products liability. We 
impose strict liability on product manufacturers and sellers to encourage them to invest in safety. We 
also offer contingency fees that give lawyers an incentive to find and litigate cases, which in turn 
impose damages that further encourage manufacturers to build things safely. Because of this system 
of laws, we do not have a complex set of explicit regulations detailing that a manufacturer must 
build a chair with these dimensions or else suffer the state’s punishment. Instead, our enforcement 
mechanism is the internalization of costs and the enforcement mechanism is largely private. The 
state will not tell you how to build a chair, but if you build an unsafe chair, you will be sued by 
consumers and no one will buy your chair; these will be the costs you have to bear for building an 
unsafe chair. This type of enforcement is done through the market, but it is just as much of a way of 
exercising power and regulating the industry. 
This type of private enforcement has been much tried on the Net with mixed success. My favorite 
example is the attempt through the NII Copyright Protection Act to impose strict liability on 
Internet service providers for copyright violations perpetrated by their subscribers. The idea there is 
if I send you a copy of a pirated software program across the Internet, the copyright holders can sue 
me, as well as the online service provider. The Clinton Administration’s White Paper would have 
made the online service provider strictly liable for my copyright infringement, whether or not they 
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knew about the copyright violation. This theoretically would encourage online service providers to 
monitor what their subscribers were doing. They would make subscribers consent to digital 
detection schemes to detect copyright violations. The scheme was an attempt to exercise power over 
the Net by enlisting private parties on the one hand and using technological means on the other, all 
without state intervention. The scheme seems to me like a very, very bad idea, and thankfully, it was 
defeated. But the paradigm it represents is one that we will see again. 
Let me talk about one other example. When the ill-fated Communications Decency Act was 
proposed, a group of programmers decided that they should head off these attempts to regulate the 
Net by showing that regulation could all be done more cleanly, easily, and less coercively through 
technological means. These programmers developed a fascinating system called the Platform for 
Internet Content Selection (PICS). PICS is a rating system in which the contents of web pages could 
be rated so that undesirable content could be identified and separated out. Web pages could be rated 
both by first parties and third parties. That is to say, you could rate your own web page, saying, 
“This is Boyle’s intellectual property page, not much nudity and not much violence, some strong 
language.” Or, alternatively, you could go through a third party rating system. For example, if you do 
not want to see material that is degrading to women, you could download all your materials through 
the National Organization for Women’s server and the National Organization for Women will have 
rated and filtered out content that is degrading to women. You could use the National Rifle 
Association filtering service so you would never have to listen to any of those anti-gun nuts. The 
important point to note here is that this kind of filtering would mean that the tap no longer has to 
be either on or off. This would actually allow some selection of content. Remember that the idea 
behind the PICS scheme was that, since there was some private filtering, the desire to regulate the 
Net through the law would be curtailed. 
Of course, all actions have unintended consequences. What has happened now is that PICS has 
been seized upon as a wonderful way to rate the Net and government regulations now require the 
installation of a variety of blocking and filtering software in certain public institutions, such as 
schools and libraries. (Some of the software used is actually more problematic than PICS. My 
favorite example is the software-based filter, which aimed to block sites about sex, but which 
inadvertently also blocked all sites that contained references to feminism because—as we know—
feminists do talk constantly about sex, though perhaps not in exactly the way that the programmers 
had in mind.) What is worse, blockages are often invisible to the user; the user does not know which 
sites have been filtered out. 
VI. CONCLUSION-AN ALTERNATIVE VISION OF FREEDOM IN CYBERSPACE 
So how does all of this affect the Internet trinity? There are multiple potential methods to regulate 
web content. We could use software-filtering schemes administered through public or private 
agencies. The government could threaten not to buy your technology unless it has a filtering chip 
embedded in it. The government could require you, as it did in the Digital Telephony Act or in the 
V-chip bill, to have a certain form of technological blocking. We could construct various liability 
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schemes designed to regulate content. All of this suggests that the world is a little bit more 
complicated than we had thought. 
If you put all of this together, it might suggest an extremely unpleasant vision of the future where we 
would have many of the bad things of the libertarian vision without the good things. It might seem 
that this conjures up a world in which we have a communications technology which can be 
regulated, which can be filtered, which can be shaped in various different ways by both public and 
private parties. We could have digital “spite fences” blocking off certain kinds of content and 
limiting free expression. 
However, I would like to suggest an inversion of that picture. To me, one of the interesting things 
about the Net is the two stage argument I have tried to bring out today-the apparent fit between 
libertarianism and the Net, and then the problems that arise when we examine the Internet trinity 
closely. Indeed, although it seems that the Net fits libertarianism neatly, there are actually ways in 
which I think the Net will be deeply subversive of libertarianism and perhaps even subversive of the 
boring drone of the neoliberal Washington consensus. 
Why do I say that? Well, one of the ways in which a libertarian vision of the world resolves 
problems is to hide the problems inside the concept of property. We just say that we will give 
everyone property rights and they can make their private decisions inside the shield provided by 
their property rights. Of course, we have no cause to judge private decisions. So any kind of 
contentious decision put into the private workplace, or in the context of private ownership, and any 
kind of involvement by the state is intrusive. On the Net though, it seems to me it is extremely 
unlikely that we could maintain this vision, which hides public power behind the idea of property 
rights. The idea is that I should be able to say this is my house and I can let people in when I want to 
and tell them to leave when I want to. This is my shop, I own this shop and I can tell you whether 
or not you should be able to form a union. There is a kind of physical, tactile element involved. It is 
much harder to have that kind of absolutist, concrete vision of property when the property involved 
is intellectual, rather than physical. A man’s home may be his castle, but what about a corporation’s 
business method patent? Somehow the public choices involved in the creation and enforcement of 
the regime are a little more obvious. 
The second point is that increasingly on the Net, libertarians, as well as other people, have been 
seeing some of the problems caused by the construction of the architecture that I am describing. 
Namely, they realize there are a variety of different ways, different paths, along which this medium 
could develop. Some of these architectures will encourage this kind of behavior, some will 
encourage that kind of behavior, some will give power to this group, some will give power to that 
group. There is a realization that the construction of this architecture is actually an appropriate 
subject for public debate and discussion. The development of the Net is not merely neutral. It is not 
just going on in the background, not just “the way things are.” It is actually something that needs to 
be subject to democratic decision and debate. 
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To sum up then, if I have a fear about the Net, it is that we go forward into the future with this kind 
of high-tech version of the Lochner era. That we just turn everything over to technology on the one 
hand and to contract and private law on the other, and then wash our hands of the matter. 
If I had a hope, it would be that there would be a kind of high-tech version of legal-realism in the 
progressive era, which would start to see the various ways in which power is being exercised over 
the Net; whether through the construction of the marketplace, the design of the private law rules, or 
the enlistment of private parties. In fact, it seems to me that it is only by being aware of these 
different forms and arenas of power that we can make the Net live up to some of its utopian 
promise, that we can make the Net a product of informed and open discussion and debate.  
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